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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The facts on appeal are largely undisputed.

The issues surround the application of

current law to those facts. Mr. Keserovic argues that he did not know, nor did his attorney
advise him that he would be deported to his homeland as a result of his guilty plea and sentence
to a favorable plea offer. The State forwards that because the prosecutor and court provided
deportation information to Mr. Keserovic before he entered his plea, it was impossible not to
have anticipated this outcome.
A.

The Course of Proceedings Below

Mr. Keserovic entered a guilty plea on June 26, 2012, and was sentenced pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule ll(f). (R p. 69, L.19; p. 74, L. 10-12) The agreement contained a charge
reduction - from a felony to a misdemeanor - and a stipulated sentence. (R p. 63, L. 12-16) The
presiding magistrate accepted the plea. (R p. 74, L. 10) In January 2013, Mr. Keserovic was
deported to his native Bosnia based upon his conviction and sentence. (R p. 119, 1 3)
On September 26, 2012, Mr. Keserovic filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief before
the magistrate who accepted his guilty plea. (R p. 5) Mr. Keserovic's post-conviction attorney,
Maria E. Andrade, and the prosecutor submitted evidence, briefed the issues, and after
considering the same, the sentencing magistrate denied Mr. Keserovic's Petition, finding:
Courts nationwide engage in plea colloquies with defendants for the precise
reason that the court is not privy to conversations between attorneys and their
clients. These inquiries ensure that, notwithstanding previous conversations with
counsel, a defendant is aware of what rights he has, what rights he is giving up,
and the consequences of a plea. Most importantly, the plea colloquy provides a
record that any plea taken is knowingly and intelligently entered ....

CORRECTED APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PAGE 1
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Whatever deficiency or prejudice existed as a result of Defendant's attorney's
performance was cured prior to Defendant entering his plea; therefore this Motion
for Post-Conviction Relief is denied.
(R p. 95)

Mr. Keserovic appealed the magistrate's decision to the District Court. (R p. 102) The
Ada County Public Defender's Office was substituted as counsel. (R p. 182) The Honorable
Judge Michael McLaughlin heard the appeal, and after considering briefs and argument, reversed
the magistrate's decision. (R p. 225-239) Judge McLaughlin determined that "trial counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." (R p. 237) His decision
continued: "that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, it
is not likely he would have entered his plea here." (R p. 237) The Court determined that "[t]he
issue of prejudice has not been addressed by Judge Gardunia" (R p. 238), and remanded the case
to Judge Gardunia for further proceedings. (R p. 238)
The State timely appealed Judge McLaughlin's decision. (R p. 241)
B.

Statement of Facts

Mr. Keserovic stole a purse at a Winco grocery store on November 23, 2011. (R p. 44, L.
14-25) He was charged with Theft on January 6, 2012, and retained attorney Jeff McKinnie to
represent him. (R p. 226, L. 3-6) As described by Mr. McKinnie at the plea hearing:
This was a theft that had occurred in Winco. It was all captured on video. It was
a purse that was taken out of the victim's shopping cart. Three or four months
later, Mr. Keserovic was contacted by the police, voluntarily went down. The
person in the video looked exactly like him. There was ample evidence to support
that there was a factual basis for it. Mr. Keserovic said it looked like him but he

CORRECTED APPELLANT'S BRIEF-PAGE 2
g:\jkd\keserovic\brief\appellant's brief - final corrected.doc

didn't do it. ... Certainly there was enough evidence that he could have been
convicted of this.
(R p. 44, L.14-25, p. 45, L. 1-3) Mr. Keserovic admitted the person on camera committing the
theft "resembled" him. (R p. 47, L. 2-3.)
The prosecutor and Mr. McKinnie negotiated a Rule 1 l(f) plea and sentencing
agreement. The stipulation allowed Mr. Keserovic to plead guilty to a reduced charge, thereby
avoiding exposure to a potential prison sentence. He agreed to be sentenced to 365 days in jail
with 305 days suspended. (R p. 40, L. 17-25)
While in jail, but prior to the entry of his misdemeanor plea, Mr. Keserovic was in
contact with an immigration officer.

(R. p. 26-27, Keserovic's Affidavit p. 1,

~

3.)

The

immigration officer told Mr. Keserovic that he would be deported if he pled guilty to a felony.
Id.

At Mr. Keserovic's change-of-plea hearing the prosecutor explained, on the record, that
upon entering his plea and having the agreed-upon sentence imposed, Mr. Keserovic would be
subject to being deported:
Judge, I hate to do this to you, but prior to accepting the plea of guilty, we just
need to make it very clear on the record the State understands a petit theft with
365 days as being what the ICE or the federal government determines to be an
aggravated felony even though it is a misdemeanor.
It is the State's
understanding that this does subject Mr. Keserovic to deportation and so in
entering this plea of guilty, we just want it very clear on the record that he
recognizes that it does subject him to that potential.
(R p. 64, L.11-20)
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During the plea colloquy, the Court asked Mr. McKinnie whether he had discussed the
deportation issue with Mr. Keserovic. Mr. McKinnie responded, "On multiple occasions, Judge.
We've talked about the fact that this could raise immigration issues with regard to entering a plea
in this case." (R p. 64, L. 23-25) The Court continued, ensuring Mr. Keserovic understood that
"by entering a plea of guilty to this charge this morning that it could affect your citizenship, your
application for citizenship or your ability to work in the United States?" (R p. 65, L. 1-4) Mr.
Keserovic answered, "Yes, ma'am." (R p. 65, L. 5)
The Court invited the prosecutor to add any additional comment. The prosecutor again
emphasized: "I believe it has been discussed that it subjects him to deportation and so I don't
have anything else to add after that." (R p. 44, L. 6-8)
The magistrate court accepted the stipulated Rule 11 (f) agreement and Mr. Keserovic' s
guilty plea, and imposed the sentence upon which the parties had agreed. (R p. 48, L. 10-19)
Consistent with the multiple warnings during his sentencing, Mr. Keserovic was detained by
Customs officials on September 10, 2012, and eventually returned to his homeland. (R p. 119, 1
3)

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err by Reversing the Magistrate's Summary Dismissal of Mr.
Keserovic's Petition Seeking Post-Conviction Relief?

2.

Did the District Court err in Remanding the Case for Further Proceedings?

CORRECTED APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

When rev1ewmg a district court's intermediate appellate review of a magistrate's
summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor,
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807,
839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct.
App. 1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). On

review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate capacity, the
reviewing court " ... directly review[ s] the district court's decision to determine whether it
correctly decided the issues presented to it on appeal." Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233
P.3d 102, 107 (201 O); see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).
IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Law

To prevail below, based upon current law, Mr. Keserovic was obligated to show that Mr.
McKinnie' s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that deficient
representation prejudiced Mr. Keserovic.
Our Court of Appeals has explained that the analysis for deficient representation and the
attendant prejudice are separate considerations:
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[O]n a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must
show that the attorney's performance was deficient and, in most cases, must also
show that prejudice resulteq from the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517,520,960 P.2d 738,741 (1998); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,
316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794
P.2d 654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at
693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760,760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67,794 P.2d at 656. To
establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney's deficient performance *659 **43 the outcome of the criminal case
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80
L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P .2d at 741; Aragon, 114 Idaho at
761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656.
lvfintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-59, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007).

As explained in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), deportation
issues may be raised in post-conviction cases, but the analysis is still subject to scrutiny under
Strickland, Supra. See also Chaidez v. US., ---U.S.---, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013). In other words,
Padilla did not develop a per se rule or a presumption of prejudice in such cases. In fact,

Padilla's case was remanded for further proceedings because, "[w]hether Padilla is entitled to
relief will depend on whether he can demonstrate prejudice as a result thereof, a question we do
not reach because it was not passed on below." Padilla at 375. The Supreme Court continued:
"to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to
reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Id. at 372.
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In determining the prejudice prong, a court is not limited to the conversations between
client and counsel. Rather, a court may also consider information a defendant gains from the
Prosecutor or the Court. As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
Lozano challenges .... on the ground that his counsel was ineffective by failing to
inform him of the possible immigration consequences of his plea, as required
under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The district court properly
denied Lozano's motion because he cannot demonstrate prejudice. Lozano was
informed of the possible immigration consequences by the plea agreement and at
the plea colloquy, and he has not shown that "a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances."
US. v. Lozano, 540 Fed. Appx.793 (9 th Cir 2013). 1

Because Lozano was aware of the "possible immigration consequences" from "the plea
agreement"2 and the "plea colloquy," the Ninth Circuit was unable to find his attorney was
ineffective and refused to reject the plea agreement.
This area oflaw is far from static. Courts continue to flesh out this important area oflaw.
In fact, both this Court and our Court of Appeals have issued two decisions since the district
court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order in this matter. In Murray v. State, 156 Idaho
159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014), this Court decided issues involving the United States Constitution's
Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, as well as the Fifth Amendment right
prohibiting forced self-incrimination . .Murray determined that information supplied by the court
rather than by Murray's defense counsel was sufficient for a knowledgeable waiver. In that case,

While this opinion is not formally published and does not carry any precedential value, the
State submits that it offers helpful insights and analysis.
2 The State assumes the plea agreement, whether oral or written, was furnished by the prosecutor
in Lozano.
1
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Murray argued that his attorney was deficient for failing to advise him of his Estrada rights and
that he was then prejudiced because he then participated in a court-ordered domestic violence
evaluation without his attorney, and statements from the evaluation were used against him. This
Court concluded that Murray's attorney, " ... failing to apprise Murray of his Estrada rights, was
objectively deficient." Murray v. State at 717, citing Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d
833 (2006). But even though the attorney's representation was found to be deficient, the analysis
was not complete. The Court continued to the "prejudice" step, explaining:
After being fully informed of his Estrada rights, and despite the court's
requirement that he waive his Estrada rights and fully comply with the court
ordered domestic violence evaluation, Murray still pleaded guilty. The record
conclusively establishes that Murray understood his rights under Estrada and was
aware that in order for the court to accept the parties' plea agreement he would
have to waive his Estrada rights ... Because the record establishes that Murray
fully understood his Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them, Murray has
failed to meet the Pinholster standard by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of
different result in this case had Martens' representation not been deficient.
Furthermore, under this Court's decision in Booth, Murray has also failed to
demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 151
Idaho 612, 621, 262 P.3d 255, 264 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho
671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010)). Accordingly, Murray has failed to show the
requisite prejudice necessary to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim under Strickland.
Murray, Supra, at 718.
Murray was favorably cited by an even more recent Court of Appeals case. In Grant v.
State, --- P.3d---, 2014 WL 1664086 (Idaho App.), the court explained:

.... Grant's claim of ineffective assistance is disproved by his guilty plea advisory
forms. The district court found that these forms indicate Grant understood his
right to remain silent even after pleading guilty. Specifically, Grant indicated he
understood he had the right to "refuse to answer or provide any information that
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might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which" he was pleading
guilty. Grant also indicated he had sufficient time to discuss his case with his
attorney. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Grant's attorney failed to advise
him of his right to refuse to participate in the psychological evaluation, Grant
failed to establish the possibility of a valid claim, as Grant has failed to allege in
what manner he was prejudiced.
The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed an Estrada claim arising in a similar
context in Murray v. State, Idaho - - , - - , -P.3d - - , - - (2014).
There, the Court held, where the record establishes a defendant fully understood
his or her Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them, the defendant fails to
establish prejudice by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of a different result
had the attorney's representation not been deficient. Id. at--, 149 P.3d 833,
P.3d at--. The situation here is analogous to that in Murray. Grant was aware
of his right not to participate in the evaluation and has failed to demonstrate how
having his attorney additionally advise him of this right would have made any
difference. Thus, Grant failed to allege the possibility of a valid claim.
Grant v. State3, No. 39207, 2014 WL 1664086 p. 5 (Idaho Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2014).

The State forwards that applying the teachings of Padilla, Strickland, and Lozano,
coupled with the recent rulings in Murray and Grant, a criminal defendant is accountable for
information supplied to him or her from sources other than his or her attorney, and in such
instances, he is not prejudiced.
B.

Analysis
1. Keserovic Cannot Establish Strickland Prejudice Because it Was Not Rational to

Reject the Rule 11 Offer

Although Grant has not been released for official publication, the similarity of the situation
with the one currently before the Court is striking. A criminal defendant who has been clearly
advised, whether in the Guilty Plea Form or in open court should not be permitted to later claim
that his decisions were not knowingly made.
3
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The Honorable Judge Michael McLaughlin reversed Judge Gardunia's summary
dismissal on the grounds that Judge Gardunia had not addressed prejudice. To the contrary,
Judge Gardunia's January 28, 2013 order involves a thorough analysis of prejudice in these
circumstances. Judge Gardunia articulated the prejudice standard in cases involving a guilty
plea, saying, "Defendant must still show that but for that deficient performance the result (plea)
would have been different." (R p. 95)

Judge Gardunia went on to find that, "[T]his the

Defendant cannot do. Notice of the consequences of his plea was, according to the record,
clearly provided." (R p. 96) Judge Gardunia's opinion concluded that, "whatever deficiency or
prejudice existed as a result of Defendant's attorney's performance was cured prior to Defendant
entering his plea." (Id., emphasis added).

The State submits that Judge Gardunia correctly

analyzed the prejudice issue and the district court erred in reversing the ruling. In fact, consistent
with Padilla, the prejudice analysis is the proper focus in this case.
The first prong of a proper Padilla analysis requires that Mr. Keserovic show that Mr.
McKinnie's advice was so deficient that his representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. 4 Rather than focus on this prong of Padilla, the magistrate followed Strickland's
invitation:
In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of
the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that
course should be followed. Id at 2069.

4

As the magistrate noted: "the record in this regard is contradictory." (R p. 95 FN)
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Consistent with the Supreme Court's suggestion, the State will also concentrate on the
second prong of the Strickland analysis. Mr. Keserovic's argument that he was prejudiced by
pleading guilty is clearly an attempt for a second bite at the apple. Upholding the district court's
decision means finding that Mr. Keserovic's decision to accept the settlement agreement was
irrational, and that rejection of the Rule 11 plea agreement affording him a misdemeanor rather
than the potential for a felony conviction (and a possible prison sentence) was the only logical
decision.
The Court is not required to believe Mr. Keserovic's claim that he would not have pied
guilty but for counsel's advice. This Court may look at the nature of the case, and the fact that
there was a surveillance video of the Defendant stealing the victim's purse, where even defense
counsel conceded that the person stealing the bag looks "exactly" like the Defendant. (R p. 44,
L. 14-20; p. 45, L. 2-3.) In fact, the magistrate judge lectured Mr. Keserovic that: "[Y]ou need

to accept that you got caught red-handed meaning a video tape exists of you stealing something
out of somebody's cart. That's just the pure facts of the matter. And you believe that that's true
enough that you are here today entering a plea of guilty on the charge." (R p. 73, L. 23-25, p. 74,
L. 1-3)

Exercising his right to a felony jury trial would have likely meant that he would be
convicted of Grand Theft, with all of the accompanying consequences in the United States,
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followed by deportation anyway. The choice to avoid felony consequences was rational. A
decision to reject the plea agreement would not have been rational. 5
Mr. Keserovic was entitled to exercise his right to trial. .. but he was equally entitled to
waive that right and enter into the advantageous plea agreement. Rights lose meaning if their
exercise is not truly a decision of the individual. A defendant's interest in a favorable plea
agreement has been elevated in recent cases such as Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L.
Ed. 2d 398 (2012), where criminal defense counsel was deemed ineffective for not
recommending his client accept a plea offer. "[T]he defendant who goes to trial instead of taking

a more favorable plea may be prejudiced from either a conviction on more serious counts or the
imposition of a more severe sentence." Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. In this environment, it is
inconsistent to say that defendants who face deportation lose the ability to make knowing and
voluntary decisions to enter guilty pleas rather than proceed to trial, despite being in full receipt
of the facts.

5

This is particularly true where Mr. Keserovic was on misdemeanor probation for Battery at the
time of the plea hearing in front of Judge Gardunia. (R p. 67) Mr. Keserovic had other criminal
convictions that could serve as aggravating factors at sentencing, including: Battery (CR MD
2010-0009108; Battery and Unlawful Entry (CR MD 2010-0009072; Domestic Battery (CR MD
2009-0015503; Marijuana Possession (CR MD 2006-0016911); Disturbing the Peace (CR MD
2006-0012701); Driving Without Privileges (CR MD 2005-0014346); Inattentive Driving (CR
IN 2005-0012317); Driving Without Privileges (CR MD 2005-0002998); Driving Without
Privileges (CR MD 2005-0000656); Battery (CR MD 2004-0012834); Inattentive Driving (CR
IN 2002-0054826); Negligent Driving (CR IN 2002-0015668), as well as several prior violations
of misdemeanor probation, in case nos. CR MD 2010-0009108, CR MD 2010-0009072, CR MD
2009-0015503, CR MD 2006-0012701, and CR IN 2005-0012317. (www.idcourts.us/repository)
(Pending Motion to Augment.)
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Given that the notice of deportation occurred on the record at the plea hearing, for Mr.
Keserovic to say he would have pursued a trial if fully informed is disingenuous

he was in fact

aware of the consequences, but chose to proceed with the plea. Mr. Keserovic made this choice
after being clearly advised. Accordingly, no prejudice can attach even assuming arguendo that
counsel gave Mr. Keserovic incomplete information.
Further, to accept Mr. Keserovic's new position and invalidate his earlier choice to plead
guilty puts the entire plea system on tenuous footing. Any defense attorney with a client who is
facing deportation will be in a difficult position. If a defense attorney gives accurate advice and
the client enters a guilty plea, the client is deported. However, if the defense attorney gives
inadequate or inaccurate advice, the client and attorney file affidavits and have their plea set
aside. Defense counsel will have Robson's Choices.

To protect a client from deportation,

counsel will be inclined to give inaccurate legal advice claiming deportation is not possible.
Obviously the situation is fraught with difficulties.
2. Keserovic Cannot Establish Prejudice Because He Entered His Plea Fully Aware of
Deportation
The State submits that the district court erred in remanding for further proceedings
because there is no genuine issue of material fact. No further proceedings are necessary because
Mr. Keserovic cannot establish that knowledge about his deportation would change the outcome,
because he did know. To prevail below Mr. Keserovic would have had to establish as true a lack
of notice, something that the record conclusively shows as false.
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Thus, even if given an

evidentiary hearing, he could not establish the existence of that material fact. Consequently,
Judge Gardunia's dismissal of the petition was proper.
Contrary to Mr. Keserovic's arguments below, the district court properly held that it is
possible for "statements from the court or the state [to] negate trial counsel's erroneous advice."
Memorandum and Decision at R p. 237, fn 7. But the district court determined, even though the

magistrate advised Keserovic that the conviction could affect "his citizenship, his application for
citizenship, or his ability to work in the United States" (citations omitted) ... [t]he Court did not
specifically inform Mr. Keserovic that his conviction would result in his mandatory deportation
from the United States." Memorandum and Decision at R p. 237.

The State respectfully

disagrees with the district court's determination, especially given that the decision predated two
recent appellate court decisions which lend further guidance to the prejudice analysis.
While Padilla, supra, lends instruction to Mr. Keserovic's situation, it is distinguishable.
In Padilla the lawyer "provided false assurance that his conviction would not result in his
removal from the country." Padilla at 368. Further, nothing in the Padilla opinion reflects that
Padilla was ever given accurate notice of the consequences of his plea.
Contrarily, before Mr. Keserovic entered his guilty plea, he spoke with an immigration
official. Then, at his sentencing the prosecutor warned:
We just need to make it very clear on the record the State understands a
petit theft with 365 days as being what the ICE or the federal government
determines to be an aggravated felony even though it is a misdemeanor. It is the
State's understanding that this does subject Mr. Keserovic to deportation and so in
entering this plea of guilty, we just want it very clear on the record that he
recognizes that it does subject him to that potential. (R p. 64, L.11-20)
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During the plea colloquy, the Court asked Mr. McKinnie whether he had broached the
deportation issue with Mr. Keserovic. Mr. McKinnie responded "On multiple occasions, Judge.
We've talked about the fact that this could raise immigration issues with regard to entering a plea
in this case." (R p. 64, L. 23-25) The Court continued, ensuring Mr. Keserovic understood that
"by entering a plea of guilty to this charge this morning that it could affect your citizenship, your
application for citizenship or your ability to work in the United States?" (R p. 65, L. 1-4) Mr.
Keserovic answered in the affirmative. (R p. 65, L. 5) The Court invited the prosecutor to add
any additional comment. The prosecutor again emphasized: "I believe it has been discussed that
it subjects him to deportation and so I don't have anything else to add after that." (R p. 44, L. 68) Taken together these comments put Mr. Keserovic on notice that deportation was mandatory.
Further, notice of deportation can be phrased with words such as "could" and still be
sufficient under Padilla. See US v. Valedon, 496 Fed. Appx. 744 (9 th Cir 2012), where the
district court's advice that there "could" be immigration consequences to the conviction did not
violate due process or render the plea involuntary or unknowing. In Lozano, supra, because
Lozano was aware of the "possible immigration consequences" from "the plea agreement" and
the "plea colloquy," the Ninth Circuit was unable to find his attorney was ineffective and that the
plea agreement should have been rejected.
Additionally, the notice of the existence of certain rights or consequences may be given
by the court. In Murray, supra, the district court's admonition of Estrada rights was deemed
sufficient to put the defendant on notice, rendering his rights waiver and plea acceptable. Lastly,

Grant, supra, held that where the record establishes a defendant fully understood his or her
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Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them, the defendant failed to establish prejudice by
demonstrating a substantial likelihood of a different result had the attorney's representation not
been deficient.
Mr. Keserovic was fully aware of deportation implications. He entered a guilty plea after
two warnings from the prosecutor and the one from the court concerning the deportation
consequences flowing from his plea. He cannot show how he was prejudiced by his knowing
decision to plead guilty.
Keserovic's original Petition stated, "to the extent that the court or the prosecutor phrases
the consequences in a reasonably accurate fashion, the defendant cannot know whether by
chance to the judge or the state has gotten it right." (Verified Petition, R p. 23) The State takes
this as a concession that the notice given by the State and the Court at the plea hearing was
"reasonably accurate," from Mr. Keserovic's perspective. Accordingly, even Mr. Keserovic
agrees that he was given "reasonably accurate" notice and made the informed decision to
proceed with his plea. For Mr. Keserovic to now forward that he would have opted for a trial if
fully informed is disingenuous - he was aware of the consequences, but chose to proceed with
the plea. Mr. Keserovic made his own choice after being clearly advised.
Surely if notice regarding one's rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution is not provided by counsel and that deficiency can be provided by the District Court
via the Guilty Plea form, see Murray, supra, notice regarding the collateral consequence of
deportation can also be provided by the State and the Court. Here Keserovic was advised orally,
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in open court, rather than in a printed document which he could have easily ignored, or only
skimmed.

The State submits that the extensive dialogue regarding deportation with Mr.

Keserovic provided an even higher level of notice than that in Murray. Mr. Keserovic, like Mr.
Murray, cannot claim ignorance of a fact of which he was clearly aware.
The district court seems to accept Mr. Keserovic' s argument that the State would have
agreed to a lesser sentence given some additional information or negotiation. Mr. Keserovic's
claims in this regard are bald assertions with no support.

In a post-conviction setting, the

magistrate was "not required to accept ... the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence." Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437-8, 163 P.3d 222,
226-7 (Ct. App. 2007), citing Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d. 898,901 (Ct.App.
1994). This baseless claim should not have been given any weight or consideration by the
magistrate; nor does it provide a basis for reversal by the district court. In fact, given Mr.
Keserovic' s record (see footnote 5) and the facts of this case, it is safe to say that no more
favorable outcome was possible.
Based on the foregoing, the district court's reversal should be overturned, the
magistrate's decision affirmed and the Post-Conviction proceedings dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION

Mr. Keserovic took advantage of a settlement offer wherein he escaped a likely felony
conviction with a potential prison sentence of fifteen (15) years followed by certain deportation,
and replaced it with a misdemeanor conviction, sixty days in county jail and the same collateral
consequence of deportation. He did so after having been fully advised on the open record.
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A voiding a potential penitentiary sentence and the attendant consequences was a rational
decision from which Mr. Keserovic suffered no prejudicial effect. The magistrate court correctly
concluded that his post-conviction case had no merit. The State asks that the district court
decision be reversed and the magistrate's decision be affirmed.
DATED this 2 nd day of July, 2014.
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